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Abstract 
 Some interpersonal verbs show an implicit causality bias in favor of their subject or their object. 
Such a bias is generally seen in off-line continuation tasks where participants are required to finish a 
fragment containing the verb (e.g., Peter annoyed Jane because …). The implicit causality bias has been 
ascribed to the subject's focusing on the initiator of the event denoted by the verb. According to this 
"Focusing theory" the implicit cause has a higher level of activation, at least after the connective 
"because" has been read. Recently, the Focusing theory has been criticized by researchers who used a 
probe recognition or reading time methodology. However no clear alternative has been proposed to 
explain the off-line continuation data. In this paper, we report three experiments using an on-line 
continuation task which showed that subjects took more time to imagine an ending when the fragment to 
be completed contained an anaphor that was incongruent with the verbal bias (e.g. Peter annoyed Jane 
because she …).  This result suggests that the off-line continuation data could reflect the cognitive effort 
associated with finding a predicate with an agent incongruent with the implicit causality bias of a verb. In 
the discussion, we suggest that this effort could be related to the number of constraints that an 
incongruent clause must satisfy to be consistent with the causal structure of the discourse. 
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How long does it take to find a cause ? 
An on-line investigation of implicit causality in sentence production 
Introduction  
Assigning a cause to an event can depend on the way this event is described. For instance, when 
we consider sentence (1), we generally assume that the cause of the disappointment is the attitude or the 
behavior of John, the first participant in the sentence. 
(1) John disappointed Bill because he … 
 Conversely, for sentence (2), the cause of the admiration is generally assigned to the second 
participant Bill. 
(2) John admired Bill because he … 
 Garvey and Carmazza (1974) were the first authors who noticed that many verbs show a strong 
causality bias towards their subject or their object. Using a continuation task, Garvey, Caramazza and 
Yates (1975) showed that the continuations of (1) and (2) were generally consistent with the assignment 
of the implicit cause to the ambiguous pronoun. Of course, in continuation studies, the fact that the 
implicit cause of some verbs is either the subject or the object emerges as a "bias" and generally not as an 
all or none phenomenon. For instance, Au (1986) tested 48 verbs and found that some verbs like 
"disappoint" show a bias of 80% in favor of their subject. Some subjects can find a way to assign the 
cause to the other noun as in (3). 
 
 (3) John disappointed Bill because he set himself up for disappointment. 
 
This sort of continuation is said to be incongruent with the bias of the verb if a majority of subjects prefer 
to assign the cause to the other noun. 
The implicit causality of verbs is not only revealed by continuation data. Some on-line 
comprehension experiments have shown that implicit causality bias has effects on the reading time of the 
causal clause, or on the level of activation of the cause. 
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Caramazza, Grober, and Yates (1977) presented sentences like (4) and (5). The subjects had to 
say the name of the pronoun referent, and response times were measured. 
 
 (4) Tom scolded Bill because he was annoying. 
 (5) Tom scolded Bill because he was annoyed. 
 
They found longer response times when the ending was not congruent. Using the same method, 
Ehrlich (1980) confirmed that the choice of the referent was influenced by the causality relation denoted 
by the connective "because": another connective like "but" elicited different answers. 
Many other studies found the same type of result when the reading time of the causal clause was 
measured (e.g. Garnham, Oakhill, & Cruttenden, 1992; Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 2000; Rigalleau, 
Caplan, & Baudiffier, 2004). Garnham et al. (1992) showed that the effect of congruity tended to be 
stronger when the inference needed to connect the two clauses was simple. An interesting point is that 
the congruency effect on the reading time of the second clause is still observed when a gender cue on the 
pronoun agrees with only one antecedent (i.e., "Bill" is replaced by "Sue" in (4)). So, even when the 
pronoun itself is sufficient to determine its reference, the integration of the causal clause remains harder 
if it is not congruent with the bias of the main verb. 
It could be argued that incongruent endings result in less plausible sentences. In their 
experiments, Stewart et al. used a pre-test to equate the plausibility of the congruent and incongruent 
versions. They reported a numerically smaller congruency effect (113 ms) when the pronoun had an 
ambiguous gender than when the pronoun was unambiguous (206 ms) (Stewart et al., 2000, Exp. 4; see 
also Garnham et al., 1992 for a similar trend). This persistence of the congruency effect in reading times 
for incongruent second clauses equated for inherent plausibility with congruent clauses whose subject 
pronouns unambiguously refer to one noun in a previous sentence suggests that part of the effect reflects 
the time to semantically integrate the predicate of the incongruent pronoun into a representation of the 
discourse structure that is constructed. 
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The other main source of on-line data regarding the implicit causality effect is the probe 
recognition paradigm. Here, the first or the second noun is presented as a target during the processing of 
a sentence such (4) or (5) containing an implicit causality verb. The subject has to decide, as quickly as 
possible, whether this word was present in the sentence. The position where the target is presented is 
usually varied in the causal clause: before the pronoun, after it, after the verb following the pronoun or at 
the end of the causal clause. The main goal is to determine if the implicit cause is more activated in 
working memory. 
Some researchers have claimed that the implicit cause (the initiator in the terminology introduced 
by Osgood, 1970) is more activated than the other noun (the reactor) before the pronoun is perceived 
(McKoon, Greene, & Ratcliff, 1993; McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; Greene and McKoon, 1995). 
This "Focusing theory" of the implicit causality does not rest on clear results. Testing before the pronoun, 
McDonald and MacWhinney (1995) found a faster recognition for the implicit cause, but all their 
experimental items had congruent endings, allowing strategic anticipation of the implicit cause. The 
occurrence of this strategic effect is consistent with probe recognition data reported by Garnham, Traxler, 
Oakhill and Gernsbacher (1996). They tested experimental items with congruent and incongruent 
endings, and they failed to show an early implicit causality effect (i.e., when the probes were presented 
after the pronoun). The experiments reported by McKoon and al. (1993) used the two types of endings, 
but the authors tested only one probe position: at the end of the causal clause. The authors used pronouns 
which were unambiguous in gender, as in (6) where the ending is not congruent. 
 
(6) James infuriated Debbie because she had to write all the speeches. 
 
In four experiments, they systematically found a recognition time advantage for the referent agreeing 
with the pronoun. An advantage in favor of the Initiator was only found in two experiments: in 
Experiment 2, this advantage was observed in probe recognition time, in Experiment 3, this advantage 
occurred in recognition errors for the probes. According to McKoon et al. (1993, p. 1046), the Initiator's 
advantage (sometimes observed) at the end of the sentence reflected "some effect of the initial greater 
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accessibility of the character in the initiator role [that] might survive to the end of the sentence". If this 
interpretation is correct, we should expect that the Initiator's advantage at the end of the sentence is 
related to the same (or a greater) advantage occurring before the end of the sentence. However, this 
prediction is inconsistent with the results reported by Greene et al. (1995) who tested the probes at earlier 
positions. For instance, using N1 biasing verbs, McKoon et al. (1993, Exp. 2) had showed a significant 
recognition time advantage for the Initiator (778 ms) relative to the Reactor (815 ms) at the end of the 
because-clause. In their Experiment 3, Greene et al. (1995) also used N1 biasing verbs in the main 
clauses, and they added sentences before the implicit verb sentence. Greene et al. (1995) measured the 
recognition times for the Initiator and the Reactor before N1 biasing verbs and immediately after the 
pronoun which followed these verbs. At these two points, they failed to show any advantage of 
accessibility for the Initiator. In particular, at the point where the "initial greater accessibility" of the 
Initiator should be observed (i.e. immediately after the pronoun which followed the N1 biasing verb and 
the connective "because"), the mean recognition times were 982 ms for the Initiator and 970 ms for the 
Reactor. Thus, ascribing the (non systematic) final accessibility advantage of the Initiator to a surviving 
prior advantage does not seem correct. For N2 biasing verbs, the experiments reported by Greene et al. 
(1995) showed data that were more consistent with the Focusing theory: immediately after the pronoun, 
the Initiator was more activated than the Reactor. However, this advantage could reflect a recency effect 
(cf. Stewart, Pickering, and Sanford, 2000, p. 424; and Garnham, 2001, p. 133; for more complete 
discussions). 
This short review of probe studies shows first that probe recognition studies do not give 
unequivocal results concerning the on-line effects of the implicit causality of verbs. The studies that 
showed an implicit causality effect either tested only sentences with congruent endings, or showed 
unreliable effects in favor of the Initiator when the probes were presented immediately at the end of the 
because-sentence. Because the "Focusing theory" of the implicit causality predicts an earlier effect, 
emerging immediately after reading the connective "because," it has not been confirmed when it has been 
rigorously tested. 
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In their fourth experiment, Stewart et al. (2000) directly tested the Focusing theory by measuring 
the reading times of the two parts of sentences like (7) and (8), where "apologize" is a N1 biasing verb. 
 
(7) Daniel apologized to Joanne because he / had been behaving selfishly. 
(8) Joanne apologized to Arnold because he / didn't deserve the criticism. 
 
 The authors did not show a significant reading time difference on the first part of (7) and (8), 
even though the pronoun referred to the noun that was in the discourse focus only in (7). However, as 
mentioned earlier, the reading time of the second part was longer for (8), confirming that the incongruent 
ending was more difficult to process. 
An alternative theory was proposed by Garnham et al. (1996) to explain the on-line effects of 
implicit causality on reading times. According to these authors, the congruency effect often noticed in 
these studies could reflect the difficulty in integrating a non-congruent cause with the first clause 
containing the verb. Stewart et al. (2000) suggested that implicit causality information influenced a later 
stage of processing "during, or after the process of assigning the explicit cause, and at the point when the 
interpretations of the two clauses are integrated into a single interpretation of the sentence as a whole." 
(p. 424). 
Although the "Focusing theory" of implicit causality is not confirmed by several studies, it has a 
clear advantage relative to the "Integration theory": it allows a single explanation for results obtained in 
continuation studies and in reading time studies. Both in production and in comprehension, the processor 
should assign more activation to the Initiator of the implicit causality verb. In production, this would 
promote a reference to this Initiator in the continuation written by the subject. In comprehension, this 
would induce a shorter reading time to integrate a causal clause where this Initiator is mentioned (relative 
to a clause where the reactor is mentioned). On the other hand, the "Integration theory," as it is currently 
stated, can only explain the reading times results because it refers explicitly to the integration of an 
explicit cause with the first main clause. 
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In this paper, we would like to promote an elaboration of the "Integration theory" as an alternative 
view to the "Focusing theory", which can explain the clear off-line continuation effects observed in 
production. We suggest that at least part of the biases observed in continuation of fragments like (9) 
reflects the processing difficulty associated with finding a causal property consistent with the Reactor of 
the event (i.e. Arnold in (9)). This property is the predicate assigned to the entity referred after the 
"because" connective. In (8), this predicate is "didn't deserve the criticism". It is selected as a relevant 
property to involve the Reactor in a cause of the apologize. In other words, if a subject tries to imagine an 
ending of (9) with "he," this subject will need time to find a property consistent with the causal status of 
the Reactor. On the other hand, finding a property consistent with the Initiator (i.e. Joanne) would be 
easier. More precisely, if the subject starts with "she," finding an action or a property consistent will 
require less cognitive effort. 
 
(9) Joanne apologized to Arnold because … 
 
We think that this view is intuitively plausible to all researchers who have tried to create "incongruent" 
endings for verbal materials in reading time experiments about implicit causality. These incongruent 
endings are hard to construct. However, an on-line measure that can detect this difficulty has not been 
employed. In this paper, we used an on-line writing production paradigm that enabled us to evaluate the 
time required to imagine an ending for the two possible versions of (10) : 
 
 (10) Joanne apologized to Arnold because (she / he) … 
 
 The hypothesis was that the time to "imagine" a consistent property should be shorter if the 
pronoun refers to the Initiator. This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 1a and 1b where we measured 
the planning time when the subject read the pronoun. The paradigm used in Experiment 2 allowed us to 
measure the processing time of the anaphor before imagining the ending. 
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Because the Focusing theory claims that the implicit causality effects reflect the way the main 
clause is represented, they should occur immediately after reading the main clause and the causal 
connective. An immediate facilitation of the anaphoric process is predicted when the anaphor refers to 
the implicit cause. Stewart et al. (2000) formulated this prediction for the Focusing theory, "assuming 
pronouns are resolved immediately" (p.435). Although the immediacy of the resolution is under contest 
for pronouns, recent studies confirmed that the pronoun is immediately bonded to the most activated 
referent (Rigalleau and Caplan, 2000; Rigalleau, Caplan, and Baudiffier, 2004). The same immediacy has 
been checked for other types of anaphors (e.g., Almor, 1999 for superordinate noun anaphors). In 
Experiment 2, the "Focusing theory" predicted that the processing time of the anaphor should be longer if 
the anaphor refers to the reactor. Our prediction was different because we propose that implicit causality 
does not specifically enhance the activation level of the Initiator. So, we did not predict any difference in 
processing time on the anaphor itself. However, the implicit causality bias should facilitate the process of 
constructing a representation of a consistent causal property for the Initiator. Experiment 2 was similar to 
the Experiments 1a and 1b, but a noun phrase anaphor was used instead of a pronoun : the anaphor was a 
superordinate name of the antecedent (e.g., "musician" referring to "violinist"). This type of anaphor 
allowed us to add a new condition where the name in the because-clause did not refer to any name in the 
sentence. This "external name" condition was important because longer processing times were predicted 
for this "external name" than for noun anaphors referring to the Initiator or to the Reactor. 
Our hypothesis, if it is confirmed, sheds some light on late effects noticed in continuation studies. 
Although these effects seem simply and directly explained by the Focusing theory, our hypothesis offers 
another explanation: subjects prefer to continue with the Initiator because it is easier to find a property 
consistent with the Initiator, not because this Initiator is more activated than the Reactor. 
 In summary, our study was designed to test an explanation of the usual continuation data that 
does not involve a pro-active effect of focalization. In the final Discussion section, we will consider the 
relation of this explanation to the "Integration Theory" and to the reading time studies that support this 
theory. 
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The on-line continuation method 
 
 In the following experiments, we wanted to get a measure of the time required to imagine a cause. 
In the implicit causality bias studies, continuation data are usually collected by asking subjects to write a 
continuation. This methodology allows long planning times, and we preferred to maintain this modality 
of production. In the two experiments here reported, the subjects pressed a pen on a graphic tablet when 
they were imagining the continuation. They were instructed to raise the pen as soon as they were sure of 
the continuation they wanted to write. This constraint was not difficult for subjects to fulfill. 
 
Experiments 1a and 1b 
 
  In Experiment 1, subjects read the first clause of a sentence. This first clause finished with a 
causal connective (i.e. "because"). The two first names in this first clause had different genders, and they 
were the subject and the object of a N1 biasing verb or of a N2 biasing verb. After this fragment, a 
pronoun agreeing with one of the two names was presented to the subject. At this point, the task was to 
imagine a consistent ending for the clause starting with this pronoun. When this ending was found by the 
subject, s/he wrote it on paper. This paradigm enabled us to measure the time a subject took to imagine a 
cause when this cause was consistent with either the first NP or the second NP of the first clause. Our 
expectation was that this time would be longer when the pronoun was not consistent with the bias of the 
verb. 
In Experiment 1a, the subjects read the fragment at their own speed. In this way, we could get 
information about the reading times of the fragments. However, the subjects could pre-plan a potential 
continuation when they were reading the fragment (even if they did not know the pronoun at this point). 
In Experiment 1b, the fragment was presented word by word, using a rapid serial visual presentation. The 
presentation speed was quite rapid : 170 ms per word plus 17 ms per character. According to McKoon et 
al. (1993), this speed is consistent with a normal reading speed. In fact, Just and Carpenter (1987) 
considered a reading rate of 250 ms per word to be "normal" (p. 38). 
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Materials 
 Thirty-two verbs with an implicit causality bias were used to construct the stimuli. Sixteen verbs 
had a bias in favor of their grammatical subject (N1 biasing verbs), and sixteen verbs had a bias in favor 
of their grammatical object (N2 biasing verbs). The existence and the strength of the bias was checked in 
a pilot experiment involving 54 subjects (mean age: 23.45, SD = 3.36). They were students at the 
University Institute for Formation of Teachers (IUFM) of Angoulême. A first pool of 96 interpersonal 
verbs was used to construct the materials. The subjects were presented fragments containing two 
different-gender first names around a verb in the past tense, followed by the causal connective  (e.g. 
"Jean a suivi Anne parce que …" ["John followed Ann because …"]). Half of the fragments began with a 
masculine first name, and different pairs of first names were used for each fragment. The order of the two 
names was reversed for half of the subjects, to control potential interactions between gender and implicit 
causality bias. The verbs used to construct the material were chosen on the basis of the material used in 
several English language experiments on implicit causality (in particular: Greene et al., 1995; Garnham, 
Traxler, Oakhill, & Gernsbacher, 1996;Rigalleau & Caplan, 2000); French translations of the verbs were 
used. Each fragment was presented on a sheet of paper, and subjects had to write a continuation for each 
fragment starting with a pronoun "he" or "she" referring to one of the two characters mentioned in the 
fragment. The 96 sentences were divided into two groups of 48 sentences, to make this continuation task 
shorter. Half of the subjects (N = 27) had to continue 48 fragments, the other 27 subjects saw the other 
48 fragments. Each subset of 48 fragments comprised 24 a priori N1 biasing verbs and 24 a priori N2 
biasing verbs. The results allowed a selection of the final 32 verbs with same mean magnitude causality 
bias for both sets of 16 verbs (M = 81.5% of the subjects continued the fragment with a pronoun referring 
to the relevant noun). 
The N1 biasing verbs were influencer (influence), troubler (trouble), mécontenter (displease), 
effrayer (frighten) , charmer (charm), indigner (to make somebody indignate), irriter (irritate), énerver 
(annoy), désobéir (disobey), importuner (importune), supplier (implore), téléphoner (phone); persuader 
(persuade), convaincre (convince), mettre en colère (to make somebody angry) and s'excuser auprès de 
(apologize). The mean percent of N1 choice for these verbs was 81.5% (SD = 8.97). The N2 biasing 
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verbs were: juger (judge), mépriser (scorn), se méfier de (mistrust), redouter (dread), respecter (respect), 
apprécier (appreciate), craindre (fear), aimer (love), protéger (protect), engueuler (blame), secourir 
(assist), consoler (console), aider (help), punir (punish), embaucher (hire), and complimenter 
(congratulate). The mean percent of N2 choice for these verbs was 81.5% (SD = 8.55). Using the Frantex 
lexical frequency (New, Pallier, Ferrand, & Matos, 2001), the mean frequencies of the two types of verbs 
were compared (N1 biasing verbs: M = 7.1, SD = 12.6; N2 biasing verbs: M = 7.4, SD = 12.4). They 
were not significantly different: (F(1,30) < 1). However, the mean number of letters (counting the 
auxiliary and the potential preposition required by some verbs) was slightly greater for the N1 biasing 
verbs (M = 9.5, SD = 2.84) than for N2 biasing verbs (M = 7.9, SD = 2.14) (F(1,30) = 3.1, p = .08). 
 For each of the verbs, two versions of a sentence were constructed. Sentences (11-12) illustrate 
the two versions. The slash indicates the break between the two segments that were successively 
presented to the subjects. Two first names with different genders, but with identical number of letters, 
were associated with one version; for this version the pronoun referred to the first NP. In the second 
version, a different pair of first names was used; although the number of letters in each first name was 
maintained, for this second version, the pronoun referred to the second NP. So one version had a pronoun 
congruent with the verb's bias, and the other version had an incongruent pronoun. 
 
 Version with a congruent pronoun 
 (11) Bernard a influencé Martine parce que / il 
        Masc. influenced Fem. because / he 
 
 Version with an incongruent pronoun 
 (12) Etienne a influencé Josiane parce que / elle 
        Masc. influenced Fem. because / she 
 
 Different pairs of first names were assigned to each verb. The mean number of letters of the first 
names was identical for the clauses containing N1 biasing verbs and for those containing N2 biasing 
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verbs (M = 7.25 letters). All the first names used in this experiment were familiar and clearly marked in 
gender. Half of the N1 biasing verbs had a masculine first name as subject, and half had a feminine first 
name as subject (same for N2 biasing verbs). All the verbs were used in a past active form. This allowed 
the construction of a first list of 64 first clauses.  
 A second list was constructed by systematically reversing the order of the two first names in the 
clauses. Because the form of the pronoun was kept constant, this modification reversed the Congruency 
of the clause, as in (13-14). This inversion allowed us to control potential effects of gender on the 
strength of the implicit causality bias. 
 
 Version with incongruent pronoun 
 (13) Martine a influencé Bernard parce que / il 
        Fem. influenced Masc. because / he 
 
 Version with a congruent pronoun 
 (14) Josiane a influencé Etienne parce que / elle 
        Fem. influenced Masc. because / she 
 
 Twelve filler items were also constructed. These items were constituted with one verb and two 
same gender first names (6 items with two female first names, and 6 items with two male first names). 
The causal connective was replaced by "et" ("and") for these items. The pronoun was plural as illustrated 
in (15). Although the number of fillers was small, they permitted us to ensure that subjects could 
consider some contexts in which both names in the context could have similar roles in their continuation. 
 
 (15) Patrice a couru avec Anthony et / ils 
  Peter ran with Anthony and / they 
 
 Each of the two lists of 64 experimental items was mixed with the same 12 filler items. 
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For each list, five pseudo-randomized orders were established avoiding the same verb occurring in two 
successive items.  
Four training items were also constructed: three had the experimental connective (i.e., "because"), 
and one had the filler connective (i.e., "and"). 
 
Procedure 
 Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. Successive stimuli were presented in black 
characters (Times New Roman 20-point bold characters) in the center of a PC computer screen with a 
white background. The subjects used a graphic digitalizing tablet Wacom SC-421E to trigger the 
appearance of stimuli, and to write the continuation. Figure 1 illustrates the different zones of this tablet. 
_______________ 
Figure 1 here 
_________________ 
 
The procedure in the Experiment 1a was the following. To start a trial, the subject put the point of 
the pen on a departure (black) square which was outside the active zone of the tablet. A fixation point 
appeared on the screen, at the position where the first word of the following fragment should appear. The 
experimenter pressed a button which activated two events: the appearance of the fragment (e.g. "John 
annoyed Ann because") on the screen, and the onset of a measurement of what will be called the "reading 
time" of this fragment. Once the subject had read this fragment, s/he moved the lead of the pen onto a 
second (white) square on the right (distance from the departure square = 15 mm). This second square was 
on the part of the graphic digitalizing tablet where presses of the pen were recorded. When the lead 
pressed this second square, four events occurred: the fragment disappeared on the screen, it was replaced 
by a pronoun, presented in capital letters (e.g. "HE"), the internal clock of the computer finished the 
measurement of the reading time and started the measurement of what will be called the "planning time" 
of the continuation. The subject had to imagine a continuation. S/he was instructed to raise the pen from 
the square when s/he was sure of the continuation s/he wanted to write. Raising the pen activated two 
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events: the pronoun disappeared from the screen, and the internal clock finished the measurement of the 
"planning time." Finally, the subject wrote the continuation on a graphic digitalizing tablet, where all the 
movements and pauses of the pen were recorded. To finish the trial, the subject pressed an "End" square 
at the bottom of the tablet. After this, the pen was placed on the departure square of the next line to start 
the next trial. As can be seen on Figure 1, there were six trials per sheet of paper. The experimenter 
changed the sheet when the subject finished the six trials. 
The instructions required the subject to put the pen on the departure square and to look at the 
fixation point. When the fragment appeared, the subject read it silently. When s/he had finished reading, 
s/he moved the pen to press the second square which triggered the appearance of the pronoun. Then the 
subject had to imagine a consistent continuation for the fragment plus the pronoun. When this 
continuation was found, the subject could raise the pen from the second square and write the continuation 
on a line at the right of the square. 
In Experiment 1b, the subject started a trial by pressing the second square. This triggered the 
appearance of the fragment. This fragment appeared segment by segment until the segment containing 
the pronoun. Each fragment was presented with the following segments : Noun 1/ verb/ [preposition] 
Noun 2/ parce que / pronoun /. Each segment appeared in the center of the screen. The duration of 
presentation of each segment was calculated with the following formula : 170 ms per word + 17 ms per 
character. When the pronoun disappeared, the subject had to imagine a consistent continuation. The 
subject raised the pen from the second square only when the continuation was found. The planning time 
measure started at the offset of the pronoun. 
 Reading times and planning times (as well as writing times) were collected using software G-
Studio (Chesnet, Guillabert, & Esperet, 1994). 
Subjects and Design 
The subjects were students of the University of Poitiers. Twenty subjects participated in 
Experiment 1a (16 females, 4 males, mean age: 23; SD = 5.4). Twenty different subjects participated in 
Experiment 1b, (16 females, 4 males, mean age: 22; SD = 3.8). As mentioned in the material section, for 
Guerry, Gimenes, Caplan, and Rigalleau: How long does it take to find a cause ? 
An on-line investigation of implicit causality in sentence production / Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,  
vol 59, 1445-1465 
  
 16 
each experiment, there were two lists. Ten subjects were assigned to the first type, and 10 other subjects 
to the second type. 
There were two variables in the design: the causality bias of the verb in the main clause (N1 
biasing verb vs. N2 biasing verb); and the congruency of the pronoun relative to this bias (congruent vs. 
incongruent). Each subject saw each verb with a congruent pronoun and with an incongruent pronoun. 
 
Results 
 For Experiment 1a, the 1,280 continuations written by the subjects were examined by two 
independent raters to see whether they were consistent with the main clause. Three scores could be 
assigned to a continuation: 1 = only consistent with the pronoun; 2 = possible (i.e. could be consistent 
with the pronoun "he" or "she"); 3 = not consistent with the pronoun. The initial independent ratings 
disagreed on only 36 (2.8%) of the continuations. All initial disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Forty continuations received score 3, so 96.8% of the continuations were consistent with the main clause 
(63 (4.9 %) were assigned score 2), indicating that subjects followed the instruction. 
 Two response times were analyzed: the reading time of the first fragment, and the planning time. 
Hypotheses were articulated about the planing time. For these two dependent variables, the same data 
trimming was carried out. For each subject, the mean time and the standard deviation was computed for 
each of the four conditions. The times that were greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were 
defined as outliers. They were replaced by the maximum time of the subject in the relevant condition 
after extraction of the outliers. This method was used because we did not want to replace a long time by 
the mean, a method which can falsely increase the chances of making "type I error". For all the 
experiments reported in this paper, the replacement affected less than 5% of the data. 
These data were analyzed in two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each dependant variable. 
The first ANOVA used subjects as a random factor (F1) and involved two within-subject factors: Verbal 
bias (N1 biasing verb vs. N2 biasing verb); Congruency of the final pronoun with the verb bias 
(congruent vs. incongruent). The second ANOVA used items as a random factor (F2): it involved the 
same factors, but Congruency was a within-items factor, and Verb bias was a between-items factor.  
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_______________ 
Table 1 here 
_________________ 
 
Table 1 reports the mean reading times in Experiment 1a. For the reading times, the only effect 
which was significant was the main effect of the verb bias (F1 (1,19) = 24.54, p<.01; F2 (1,30)=9.1, 
p<.01). The mean reading time was longer for fragments containing a N1 biasing verbs. The effect of 
congruency was not significant (F1 (1,19) = 1.37; F2 (1,30)= 0.52); the two way interaction was also not 
significant (F1 (1,19) = 0.03; F2 (1,30)= 0.23). 
Table 2 reports what we call the mean planing times (i.e., time between the appearance of the 
pronoun on the screen and the raising of the pen to write the continuation). 
_______________ 
Table 2 here 
_________________ 
 
The ANOVAs revealed that the two main effects were significant. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
the planing time was longer when the subject had to imagine an ending following an incongruent 
pronoun (F1 (1,19) = 21.81, p<.01; F2 (1,30)= 26.69, p<.01). The main effect of the verb bias was also 
significant (F1 (1,19) = 9.5, p<.01; F2 (1,30)= 7.73, p<.01). As for the previous reading time, a longer 
time was observed for N1 biasing verbs than for N2 biasing verbs. The two-way interaction was only 
significant by items (F1 (1,19) = 2.47, p>.1; F2 (1,30)= 4.38, p<.05). For our purpose, it should be 
noticed that the congruency effect was significant for the two types of verbs (for N1 biasing verbs: F1 
(1,19) = 11.77, p< .01; F2 (1,15)= 18.12, p<.01; for N2 biasing verbs: F1 (1,19) = 6.25, p<.05; F2 (1,15)= 
8.65, p<.01). 
 In Experiment 1b, on six occasions subjects did not produce completions, in each case indicating 
they had not retained the lead-in fragment when the pronoun appeared. The 1,274 continuations written 
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by the subjects were examined by the same two independent raters to see whether they were consistent 
with the main clause. The initial independent ratings differed only on 19 (1.5%) of the continuations. 
These disagreements were all resolved by a discussion between the two raters. Only 50 continuations 
received score 3, so 96.1% of the written continuations were consistent with the main clause (only 58 
(4.6 %) were assigned score 2), indicating that subjects followed the instructions. 
For Experiment 1b, the mean planning times are reported in Table 2. The ANOVAs on planning 
times also showed a main effect of congruency (F1 (1,19) = 26 , p<.01; F2 (1,30)= 37.1, p<.01) with a 
longer time to imagine an ending following a pronoun referring to the Reactor. There was a main effect 
of verb bias (F1 (1,19) = 8.8, p<.01; F2 (1,30)= 5.7, p<.05); again, subjects took more time to imagine an 
ending following a N1 biasing verb. The two-way interaction was not significant (F1 (1,19) = 0.9; F2 
(1,30)= 1.4, p>.05). The congruency effect was significant for the two types of verbs (for N1 biasing 
verbs: F1 (1,19) = 16.9, p< .01; F2 (1,15)= 18.01, p<.01; for N2 biasing verbs: F1 (1,19) = 8.7, p<.01; F2 
(1,15)= 22.7, p<.01). Thus the RSVP version of the experiment gave results which were similar to the 
version where the subjects could process the introductory fragment at their own pace. 
 Our hypotheses concerned what we call the "planning time;" i.e., the delay before the subject 
raised the pen to write the continuation. However, it could be argued that some subjects raised the pen 
before having finished thinking of the continuation, even if the instruction explicitly instructed them not 
to do so. Because G-Studio records all the movements and pauses of the pen during the writing activity, 
we also analyzed the next time recorded on the tablet. This time corresponded to the time between a 
subject's raising the pen from the second square and the following press of the pen on the tablet to write 
the first word in the continuation. If the subjects followed the instructions, this time should be short 
relative to the planning time, and it should not be affected by the variables manipulated in the 
experiment. For the experiments reported in this paper, we did not find reliable effects of the factors at 
the .05 level by subjects or by items. The mean value of this time was 1,073 ms (SD = 422.6) in 
Experiment 1a, 1,038 ms (SD = 289.7) in Experiment 1b, (and 979 ms (SD = 339.6) in Experiment 2). 
These values were clearly less than the mean planning time values (Exp. 1a: 6,679 ms; Exp. 1b : 4,765 
ms ; Exp. 2: 13,000 ms). The other times recorded by the graphic tablet were not analyzed because they 
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varied according to the specific words written by each subject for each continuation. Although we cannot 
reject the possibility that some planning occurred during the writing, the small values for the time 
following the "planning time, " and the results for the "planning time" suggest that subjects did follow 
the instructions and did not raise the pen before having finished at least part of the planning process. 
 
Discussion 
 In these two experiments, there was a clear congruency effect on the planning time. Subjects took 
more time to imagine a cause consistent with a pronoun that did not fit the causality bias of the previous 
verb. 
 The main effect of verb bias on the two response times suggests that subjects had more difficulty 
processing a verb when its causal bias was in favor of N1. A similar effect was reported by Garnham, 
Oakhill and Cruttenden (1992, Exp 4); however Stewart et al. (2000, Exp 2-4) did not report this effect. 
This effect seems related to unknown lexical properties of the specific verbs used in different 
experimental materials. The frequency of the two types of verbs is a poor candidate to explain the effect 
because the two types of verbs did not differ for this dimension (F(1, 30) < 1). However, we noted in the 
Materials section that N1 biasing verbs were slightly longer than N2 biasing verbs in our material. We 
computed mean reading speed by dividing the reading times by the number of characters in the read 
fragment. For Experiment 1a, the ANOVAs with this cue as dependent variable still showed a significant 
effect of verb (for N1 biasing verbs: M = 203 ms/char.; SD = 63; for N2 biasing verbs: M = 190 
ms/char.; SD = 58), although this effect was only significant by subjects (F1 (1,19) = 8.9, p<.01; F2 
(1,30) = 1.91, p >.05). The raw times are reported in Table 1. It seems that at least part of the effect of 
verbs reflected differences in number of characters between the two types of verbs. 
The reading times in Experiment 1a were quite long relative to "usual" reading times in such 
experiments (e.g. between 2 and 3 seconds in Stewart et al., 2000). This aspect of the results could 
suggest two interpretations. First, subjects might have tried to plan the continuation when they were 
reading the first fragment. This was difficult because at the time the first clause was read, subjects did not 
know which participant would be referred to by the pronoun. However, they could try to plan a 
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continuation that was more likely. In this case, they would plausibly plan a continuation that contained a 
congruent pronoun. The longer "planning times" in the incongruent condition would reflect the fact that 
subjects had to abandon their first attempt to imagine a cause. This interpretation will be considered in 
Experiment 2 where the processing time of the anaphora will be measured, it should be faster when the 
anaphora refers to the Initiator. However, the results of the Experiment 1b suggest that this interpretation 
is not sufficient to explain the congruency effect on planning times. The RSVP rate was quite fast for 
subjects, on six occasions, subjects were not able to complete the fragments because the presentation was 
too fast to allow the retention of the fragment. This difficulty was never encountered by the subjects in 
Experiment 1a. It suggests that the fast RSVP rendered the reading task more difficult limiting the 
possibility of a preparation while reading the lead-in fragment. Although we cannot assert that the fast 
RSVP precluded any strategic planning. A second factor that could explain the long reading times is that 
subjects tried to covertly rehearse the fragment because the appearance of the pronoun triggered the 
disappearance of the fragment. This covert rehearsal process would be expected to be identical in all the 
conditions. Whatever the appropriate explanation of the long reading times in Experiment 1a, the results 
of the Experiment 1b showed that they were not a crucial factor in explaining the planning times results. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
 Experiments 1a and 1b showed longer planning times when subjects had to produce a 
continuation for a pronoun which was not consistent with the causal bias of the verb. However, the onset 
of this "planning time" was the instant when the pronoun appeared on the screen. The planning time 
effect could be consistent with the Focusing theory of the implicit causality effect (McKoon et al., 1993). 
According to this theory, readers focus their attention on the implicit cause of the verb. The process of 
focusing attention can be viewed as an anticipation preparing the reader to process an anaphor referring 
to the implicit cause. At least part of the longer planning time for continuations of incongruent pronouns 
could reflect the fact that these pronouns did not match this anticipation, or that subjects first tried to 
match the pronominal gender with the most active NP (the implicit cause). In the Experiment 2, we 
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directly examined this hypothesis by changing two main aspects of the experiment: the first concerned 
the procedure, the second concerned the materials. 
First, an immediate naming latency of the anaphor was measured to see if the anticipatory effect 
suggested by the Focusing theory would immediately accelerate the time required to process an anaphor 
referring to the Initiator of the previous clause. Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, & Koster (1993) used a cross-
modality naming task where subjects had to listen a linguistic context and to name a visual probe 
corresponding to an anaphor which terminated this context. They reported faster naming latencies when 
the context made the anaphoric referents highly accessible. Furthermore, their study showed that naming 
latency could be sensitive to discourse focus. 
 In the current experiment, our main expectation was that the Initiator and the Reactor 
should not elicit different naming latencies for their respective anaphors (contrary to the naming latency 
advantage for the Initiator predicted by the Focusing Theory). However, a null effect can also reflect the 
insensitivity of the task. We decided to include a new condition where we expected to get longer naming 
latencies, even if the same words were to be named. In this condition, the anaphoric pronouns were 
replaced by superordinate semantic anaphors, as in (16) where the anaphor refers to the Initiator, and in 
(17) where it refers to the Reactor. Almor (1999) showed that subordinate noun phrase anaphors (like 
pronouns) preferentially refer to focused antecedents, and thus the Focusing theory makes the same 
prediction for NP anaphors as for pronouns (Stewart et al. (2000) reported similar congruency effects 
when pronouns were replaced by repeated name anaphors). In our experiment, the replacement of 
pronouns by full noun phrases allowed us to include a condition where the final word of a context would 
not be anaphoric, as in (18).This new condition will be called the "External Name" condition. Thus, the 
same target words appeared in contexts where they did not refer to any previous word, or in conditions 
where they referred either to the Initiator or to the Reactor. This control allowed to check whether the 
naming latency was sensitive to the semantic relation existing between the target word and each of the 
referents in the context. 
 
(16) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le musicien … 
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The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the musician … 
 (17) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le marin 
  The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the seaman … 
(18) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le fauve … 
 The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the wildcat … 
 
In the psycholinguistic literature on superordinate semantic anaphora, these anaphors are usually 
presented in a sentence following the sentence that contains the antecedent (e.g. Garrod and Sanford, 
1977; Dell, McKoon, and Ratcliff, 1983; Garnham, 1989; Greene et al., 1992; Almor, 1999). 
Accordingly, as illustrated in (16-18), we placed the causal proposition in a different sentence from that 
containing the target word (which is underlined). The anaphoric name could refer either to the Initiator 
(e.g., musician) or to the Reactor (e.g., seaman). 
Again the Focusing theory predicts a longer naming latency for the Initiator. However Integration 
theory does not predict any difference between the two anaphors. In the "External Name" condition, both 
the Focusing theory and the Integration theory predict a longer naming latency than in the anaphor 
conditions because the subject could not take the name as referring to a previously mentioned entity. 
Concerning the planning times, we predicted a longer time in the condition where the anaphor referred to 
the Reactor than to the Initiator. The condition with an external name starting the continuation should 
induce longer planning time than the continuation with a name referring to the Initiator or to the Reactor 
because the absence of any coreference between two sentences makes the integration more difficult. 
 
Materials 
 
The materials used in the previous experiments were changed by replacing the names by social 
functions or animals. This replacement required three main steps. First, two verbs (one N1 biasing verb: 
"influence"; and one N2 biasing verb: "judge") were removed from the materials because we needed to 
construct three blocks of fragments with the same number of sentences. The two verbs were those which 
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had the smallest causal bias in the initial paper and pencil evaluation. Second, each of the thirty 
remaining verbs was associated with a different pair of names. The two names had same gender to avoid 
potential strategies based on gender processing which could avoid a complete semantic processing of the 
words. For each of the two names, a superordinate name was selected: this name could only refer to one 
of the two names in the pair. The two superordinate names did not differ in mean frequency or in mean 
length. Because the occurrence of social function names could modify the causal bias of the verb, and 
because we used a new construction involving two sentences, we undertook a new paper and pencil 
evaluation of the causal bias. This third step involved 40 subjects. For each verb, two versions were 
presented to 20 subjects. The order of the two names was reversed in the two versions (e.g. "Le 
violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que …vs "Le matelot a troublé le violoniste. C'est parce que 
…" ["The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because …" vs. "The sailor troubled the violinist. This is 
because …"]). Two judges evaluated the continuations to define which of the two names was used in 
subject position. The results showed that the causal bias was reversed between the two versions for 3 N1 
biasing verbs and for 3 N2 biasing verbs. For N1 biasing verbs, these verbs were "effrayer" (frighten), 
"importuner" (importune), and "supplier" (implore). For N2 biasing verbs, the three verbs were 
"redouter" (dread), "secourir" (assist), and "aider" (help). These items were removed from the materials, 
leaving twenty four verbs (12 N1 biasing verbs and 12 N2 biasing verbs). Collapsing across the two 
versions of the fragments, for N1 biasing verbs, the mean percentage of N1 continuations was 73.5% 
(Min = 62.5% ; Max = 85%) and for N2 biasing verbs, the mean percentage of N2 continuations was 
81.8% (Min = 67.5% ; Max = 92.5%). Because the final number of verbs of both type was small, we 
preferred to eliminate the type of verb factor from the final design, although each subject saw four N1 
biasing verbs and four N2 biasing verbs in each condition. Globally, the causal bias for all the verbs was 
77.7% of continuations in favor of the Initiator. Using the Frantex lexical frequency proposed by New et 
al. (2001), the mean frequencies of the anaphoric names used for each verb were compared (anaphor for 
N1 : M = 16.5, SD = 24.6; anaphor for N2 : M = 20.1, SD = 28.5). These were not significantly different 
(F(1,23) < 1). The two anaphoric names did not differ in number of letters (anaphor for N1 : M = 8.33, 
SD = 2.1; anaphor for N2 : M = 8.29, SD = 1.45), (F(1,23) < 1). 
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In the final materials, each of the 24 verbs was inserted in 6 versions, illustrated for one verb in 
examples (19)-(21). In the two first versions, the final name referred to the Initiator; in the two following 
versions, the final name referred to the Reactor, in the two final versions; the final name referred to an 
external character. For each condition, the order of the two names in the fragment was reversed. 
 
Anaphor referring to the Initiator (congruent): 
(19a) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le musicien … 
 The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the musician … 
(19b) Le matelot a troublé le violoniste. C'est parce que le marin … 
 The sailor troubled the violinist. This is because the seaman … 
Anaphor referring to the Reactor (incongruent): 
(20a) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le marin … 
 The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the seaman … 
(20b) Le matelot a troublé le violoniste. C'est parce que le musicien … 
 The sailor troubled the violinist. This is because the musician … 
Non anaphor referring to an external name: 
(21a) Le violoniste a troublé le matelot. C'est parce que le fauve … 
 The violinist troubled the sailor. This is because the wildcat … 
(21b) Le matelot a troublé le violoniste. C'est parce que le dresseur … 
 The sailor troubled the violinist. This is because the tamer … 
 
The final names used in the "External Name" condition were used as anaphors in the anaphoric 
versions of other experimental fragments. This control allowed us to get naming latencies for the same 
names in the three conditions of the experiment (i.e., "musician" could be presented either as referring to 
the Initiator, or as referring to the Reactor, or as referring to an external character in the sentence "Le 
dompteur a craint le lion. C'est parce que le musicien …" ["The trainer feared the lion. This is because 
the musician …"]). 
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There were 9 filler fragments with the connective "but." Three fragments finished with an 
anaphoric name referring to the first name, three fragments had an anaphoric name referring to the 
second name, and three fragments finished with a name referring to an external character. There were six 
practice items, two involving a third name referring to an external character. 
 
Procedure 
 As in Experiment 1b, each subject started a trial by pressing the second square. This press 
triggered the presentation of the successive words in the fragment. The presentation speed of the 
fragment was similar to Experiment 1b. The segmentation used for the initial fragment was also 
identical, but the names in the first fragment were presented together with their determiners. The target 
name serving for the naming latency measure was presented after its determiner to get a better measure of 
the naming latency of this name. Thus the segmentation was : / The N1 / verb / [preposition] the N2 / 
parce que / the / name /). The final name was presented with non capital red letters (the preceding words 
were in black letters). When the target word appeared, the internal clock started the measurement of the 
"naming latency" for the name. The subject had to name the red word as quickly as possible in a 
microphone. When the microphone was triggered, the target word disappeared and the internal clock of 
the computer started the measurement of what will be called the "planning time" of the continuation. The 
subject had to imagine a continuation, and was instructed to raise the pen from the second square when 
s/he was sure of the continuation s/he wanted to write. The raising of the pen from the second square 
finished the measurement of the "planning time." Finally, the subject wrote the continuation on a graphic 
digitalizing tablet where all the movements and pauses of the pen were recorded.  
Design and subjects 
There was one factor in this experiment : the name following "because" was either an anaphor 
referring to the Initiator (starting a congruent ending), or an anaphor referring to the Reactor (starting an 
incongruent ending), or a name referring to an external character. This factor was within subject and 
within item. 
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The 24 fragments were divided in three blocks of 8 fragments. Each block contained four N1 
biasing verbs and four N2 biasing verbs. Three first lists containing the 24 fragments were constructed. 
In each list, the fragments in each block occurred in one of the three conditions. Three other lists were 
constructed where the order of the two names in the fragment was reversed. So each of the 6 versions of 
a specific fragment (cf. 19-21) was assigned to a different list. The order of the fragments in each list was 
pseudo-ramdomized. 
Twenty four subjects participated in this experiment (19 women, 5 men, mean age: 23.7 years 
old, SD = 5.5). They were students of the University of Poitiers. Two subjects were replaced because 
they reported difficulties reading the fragments with the rapid presentation speed used in this experiment: 
for many fragments they were unable to imagine any continuation. Six groups of four subjects read each 
of the six lists. With this design, a subject read a specific verb only once, and s/he named a specific target 
name only once. 
Results 
The 576 continuations written by the subjects were examined for content by the same two 
independent raters who evaluated the continuations in Experiments 1a and 1b.  
For the 384 anaphoric continuations, the same criteria as in Experiments 1a and 1b were used to 
evaluate consistency. Three scores could be assigned to a continuation: 1 = only consistent with the 
anaphoric referent; 2 = possible (i.e. could be consistent with both referents); 3 = not consistent with the 
anaphor. The initial independent ratings disagreed on only 16 (4.2%) of the continuations. All initial 
disagreements were resolved by discussion. Globally, only 40 anaphoric continuations received score 3, 
so approximately 90% of the continuations were consistent with the main clause (among them only 22 
(6.4 %) were assigned score 2), indicating that subjects followed the instructions. 
For the 192 non-anaphoric continuations, the rating criteria had to be changed. The score 1 was 
assigned if the continuation was a consistent cause, the score 2 was assigned if the continuation could not 
be thought as a consistent cause. The two raters disagreed on only 13 (6.8%) of the continuations. All 
initial disagreements were resolved by discussion. Seventy continuations (36.4%) received score 2. This 
suggests that subjects had great difficulty imagining a consistent cause involving an external character. 
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Because each subject read only four N1 verbs in each of the three conditions, we eliminated the 
type of verb factor from the analysis. This decision allowed us to obtain eight data points in each 
condition for each subject. For the naming latencies, 2.36 % of the data were replaced by the mean of the 
subject in the relevant condition. These were missing data due to repetitions in the microphone. Here, 
replacing such data by the maximum naming latency seemed to be incorrect because the long value 
obtained was only due to a technical problem: the subject took a "normal" time to name the word even if 
the microphone did not detect this naming answer (see Marslen-Wilson et al., 1993). This was not the 
case for the base planning times where very long times could not be ascribed to technical problems. For 
these times, as in Experiments 1a and 1b, we replaced an extremely long time by the maximum time of 
the subject after rejection of the outlier. The planning time outliers were defined as the values more 2 
standard deviations around the mean of the subject in the condition. Four per cent of the planning time 
data were replaced. Using a cut-off at more 2.5 standard deviations, as in the first experiment, did not 
result in any replacement because the number of data by subject and by condition (8 data) was reduced 
relative to Experiments 1a and 1b. However, ANOVAs conducted on the data with and without 
replacement gave the same significant and non significant results. We report the data with replacement to 
allow a comparison of the mean planning times obtained in Experiment 2 and in the two previous 
experiments. Use of no replacement values would have resulted in longer mean planing times due to the 
absence of outliers. 
The mean naming latencies and the mean planning times for the three conditions are reported in 
Table 3. 
_______________ 
Table 3 here 
_________________ 
 
 For the naming latencies, the ANOVAs revealed a main effect of the condition (F1 (2,46) = 11.6, 
p<.01; F2 (2,46) = 6.3, p<.05). We computed two orthogonal tests of contrasts (Keppel and Wickens, 
2004). The first contrast showed no significant difference between the mean naming latencies in the 
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Congruent condition and in the Incongruent condition (both Fs < 1). The second contrast opposed the 
mean naming latencies in the two anaphoric conditions and the mean naming latency in the "external 
name" condition (F1 (1,23) = 16.4, p<.01; F2 (1,23) = 9.8, p <.01): naming latencies were longer when 
the word referred to an external character. 
 For the planning times, there was again a main effect of the condition (F1 (2,46) = 7.4, p<.01; F2 
(2,46) = 12.8, p<.01). The same orthogonal contrasts used for naming latencies were computed for 
planning times. These contrasts revealed that the mean planning time was longer in the Incongruent 
condition than in the Congruent condition (F1 (1,23) = 17.1, p<.01; F2 (1,23) = 16.1, p <.01). The mean 
planning time was also longer in the External condition than in the Anaphoric conditions (F1 (1,23) = 
4.9, p<.05; F2 (1,23) = 10.9, p <.01). 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 confirmed the results of Experiments 1a and 1b. Again, subjects took more time to 
produce an ending consistent with the Reactor. An important result concerned the naming latencies, 
which were sensitive to the non-anaphoric status of the external name. This result confirmed that the 
naming latency was a measure sensitive to the anaphoric status of a noun, even if this measure did not 
show any difference between an anaphor referring to the Reactor and an anaphor referring to the Initiator. 
 It should be noticed that the mean planning times obtained in Experiment 2 were much longer 
than those obtained in the previous experiments. This could reflect the fact that subjects had to consider 
the properties associated with specific social functions when they were planning their continuations. In 
the previous experiments such specific properties were not associated with the first names used in the 
fragments. This result suggests that the time required to find a predicate depends on the effort required to 
make the continuation consistent with the constraints imposed by the previous fragment: many 
continuations can be consistent with a male character named Franck, fewer predicates will be consistent 
with a violinist. The selection of an appropriate predicate requires more time when this predicate must 
satisfy more constraints. The size of the congruency effect was also greater (approximately 3 sec) in the 
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current experiment than in the previous experiments, suggesting that subjects made a greater use of these 
specific properties when they found it difficult to find a cause. 
 Finally, we note that the external name condition was very difficult. This difficulty resulted in 
longer naming latencies, in longer planning times, and in less consistent continuations. The external 
name condition was not inappropriate as revealed by the 63.6% of the continuations that were consistent. 
Two examples of consistent continuations written by subjects are given in (22)-(23) 
 
(22) The trainer feared the lion. It is because the musician frightened the animal. 
 (23) The ambassador phoned the repairman. It is because the thief stole the keys of his car. 
 
The establishment of a new referent and the computation of a potential causality relation 
involving this referent required considerable effort on the part of the subjects. As illustrated by the 
examples, the subjects imagined an additional relation between the new referent and one of the two 
characters in the fragment. 
The results of Experiments 2 confirm that the difficulty in imagining an explicit cause depends on 
the character who is involved in this cause. If the anaphor referred to the Initiator of the previous clause, 
people took less time to imagine a cause than if the pronoun referred to the Reactor. However, the 
implicit causality bias did not seem to affect the level of activation of the Initiator "proactively", as the 
Focusing theory maintains. Our results point to a delayed effect of implicit causality: finding a causal 
predicate for an anaphor referring to a Reactor is a more difficult process than finding a predicate for an 
anaphor referring to an Initiator. 
 
General Discussion 
 
 The three experiments reported in this paper showed that the time required to find an 
explicit cause for an event depends on the implicit causality bias of the verb involved in this 
event, on the lexical status of the characters involved in the event, and on the character involved 
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in the explicit cause. In Experiments 1a and 1b, imagining a causal property consistent with the 
Reactor required 1.4 seconds more than imagining a causal property consistent with the Initiator. 
This delay was even longer in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, replacing first names by social 
functions or animals increased the time required to find a consistent ending. We suggested that 
this longer time reflected the fact that consistent endings had to satisfy more semantic constraints 
when the nouns mentioned in the fragment referred to social functions. 
 The Focusing theory of the implicit causality bias predicted a longer processing time 
when an anaphor referred to the Reactor than when it referred to the Initiator . This prediction 
was not confirmed in the Experiment 2, although the naming latency of anaphoric nouns was 
faster than the naming latency of external nouns. If we take into account the numerous studies 
that have not found results consistent with the Focusing theory (Rigalleau and Caplan, 2000, 
2004; Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000), we must conclude that the Focusing theory 
offers an unsatisfactory way of explaining the on-line effects of implicit causality. 
 The Initiator and Reactor can have the same level of activation just after the causal 
connective, but it is more difficult to find a property consistent with the causal status of the 
Reactor. This can explain why the continuation data generally obtained with implicit causality 
verbs show a preference for continuations referring to the Initiator. 
 This view of the implicit causality effects observed in production is consistent with one 
aspect of the results reported in reading times studies (e.g. Garnham et al., 1992; Stewart et al., 
2000; Rigalleau, Caplan, & Baudiffier, 2004). As mentioned in the Introduction, there are cases 
in which equal congruency effects on reading times of the second clause of sentences with 
morphonologically unambiguous and morphonologically ambiguous pronouns ((24)/(25) and 
(26)/(27)), respectively have been reported, e.g., Stewart et al., 2000). 
 
(24) Thomas confessed to Daphne because he / had stolen the money. 
(25) Daphne confessed to Johnny because he / would not be judgmental. 
(26) Thomas confessed to Johnny because he / had stolen the money. 
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(27) Thomas confessed to Johnny because he / would not be judgmental. 
 
This is consistent with the view that there is no preparation for a pronoun that is congruent with 
the verb bias. The congruency effect is due to the predicate following the pronoun and not to the 
relation of the pronoun with the main clause per se. According to the Integration Theory, the 
congruency effect reflects the longer time needed to integrate the main clause and the causal 
clause when the predicate of the causal clause is consistent with the Reactor of the previous 
event. Our results suggest that this type of predicate is also more difficult to imagine. Thus both 
our production experiments and reading times studies converge in locating the main difficulty 
associated with incongruent endings at a point when the subject is integrating the predicate 
following the anaphor. We would like to finish this general discussion by considering an 
hypothesis concerning one aspect of this process. 
 We suggest that the processing difficulty associated with an incongruent predicate is due 
to the amount of relevant information constraining the integration of this type of predicate. This 
could be greater for incongruent predicates (i.e. predicates following the Reactor) than for 
congruent predicates. We suggest that this factor also influences the time required to imagine the 
predicate in our production experiments. The idea is consistent with the results of the Experiment 
2, which showed that planning was more difficult when the continuation had to satisfy more 
constraining contexts where the names referred to social functions or animals. 
 The connective "because" requires that the predicate make explicit a potential cause of 
the previous event. This constraint is present both for congruent and incongruent endings. Using 
the linguistic analysis proposed by Levin (1993), McKoon et al. (1993) argued that implicit 
causality verbs denote events where one participant is the Initiator, and the other is the Reactor. 
The Initiator corresponds to the implicit cause of the event. This means that when a congruent 
ending is present to integrate, the reader has to check that the predicate in this ending is consistent 
with the Initiator as a cause of the previous event. We suggest that, in many cases if not in all 
cases, the Reactor does not have to be considered to check that the congruent clause is consistent. 
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Two congruent instances will serve to illustrate this point. First in (24), where the ending is 
congruent, the ending seems equally consistent if Thomas stole the money from Daphne or if he 
stole the money from somebody else. The fact that the Reactor (i.e. Daphne) is involved in the 
final predicate is not important. Second, in (28), where the verb "to blame" is a N2 biasing verb, 
and "Bill" in the second clause refers to the Initiator of the "blaming" reaction, the pronoun in the 
predicate can refer either to John or to someone else. 
 
(28) John blamed Bill because Bill hated him. 
 
In (24), as in (28), the action ("stealing money" or "hating someone") is a behavior consistent 
with the Initiator as a cause. Considering the properties of the Reactor is not needed to check that 
the predicate in the because-clause is consistent with the first clause. 
 In contrast, in sentence (25), where the ending is incongruent, it seems that the predicate "would 
not be judgmental" satisfies a constraint that the verb "confess" imposes on its Initiator "Daphne". The 
verb "confess" implies that the Initiator behaved improperly. This property of the Initiator is essential to 
understanding why "being not judgmental" is a property consistent with the Reactor (i.e. Johnny) of the 
confession. The same phenomenon is easily visible in (29), where the subject anaphor refers to the 
Reactor of the blame, and the ending is incongruent. Only (29a) is a coherent interpretation of (29) 
because it also refers to the Initiator. In (29a), the verb "blame" implies that the Initiator "Bill" acted in 
some way injurious to the Reactor "John". This implication constitutes a constraint which is perfectly 
satisfied by the ending of (29a), and not by the ending of (29b). To make (29b) coherent, one has to 
imagine a reason that John hating Max would lead to John blaming Bill; one way or another, the second 
clause involves the Initiator. 
 
(29) John blamed Bill because John hated him. 
(29a) John blamed Bill because John hated Bill. 
(29b) ?? John blamed Bill because John hated Max. 
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 These two examples suggest that checking the consistency of an incongruent 
ending often requires considering the Initiator or properties of the Initiator. This remark is 
consistent with the analysis of incongruent endings proposed by McKoon et al. (1993). In 
incongruent endings, the predicate in the because-clause "explains what property or action of the 
reactor made the initiator's property effective or the initiator's action possible" (McKoon et al., 
p.1042). This suggests that both the Initiator and the Reactor exert constraints on the integration 
of incongruent endings. On the other hand, congruent endings can often be consistent without the 
Reactor being involved in the final predicate. In reading time studies, the integration of the 
congruent ending requires subjects to check whether the predicate is consistent with the Initiator 
as a cause ; the integration of incongruent endings requires them to check that the predicate is 
consistent not only with the Reactor but also with the Initiator as the implicit cause of the reaction 
of the Reactor. Of course, the same double constraint would apply when the subjects have to 
imagine incongruent endings in our paradigm. 
This proposal can be explored by examining the continuations in our three experiments. 
We counted the explicit references to the Initiator in the incongruent continuations and the 
explicit references to the Reactor in the congruent continuations for the three experiments. These 
explicit references had to be made by pronouns or repeated nouns. Table 4 reports the percentages 
of explicit references to the alternative character in the continuations written in the three 
experiments. 
 
_______________ 
Table 4 here 
_________________ 
 
For Experiments 1a and 1b, the percentage of references to the alternative character was greater in 
incongruent endings than in congruent endings (Exp. 1a: t1 (19) =4.8 , p < .01; t2 (31) = 2.99, p< 
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.01; Exp. 1b: t1 (19) = 6.5, p < .01 t2 (31) = 3.3, p< .01 ). Although the same numerical trend 
occurred in the Experiment 2, the effect was not significant, (t1 (23) = 1.67, p >.1; t2 (23) = 1.71, 
.05< p < .1 ). This suggests that imagining a consistent incongruent ending often requires that we 
consider the Initiator, and that this trend to consider the alternative character is less important 
when the ending is congruent. In their seminal paper, Garvey and Caramazza (1974, p. 463) 
noticed that a way to make an incongruent causal clause consistent is to use an explicit reference 
to the Initiator in the predicate, although they did not report any statistics to support this intuition. 
We agree with an important aspect of McKoon's analysis -- that processing a causal 
property consistent with the Reactor requires an additional constraint relative to processing a 
causal property consistent to the Initiator. We disagree with McKoon inasmuch as this does not 
require the Initiator to be more accessible than the Reactor before the predicate of the final clause 
is processed. Indeed, when congruent and incongruent endings are present in the verbal material, 
both characters can be relevant to integrating the final predicate. The factor considered in our 
discussion should deserve more attention in future works about the implicit causality, although 
we acknowledge that a full account of the issue require more extensive theorizing. 
 Our results show that the Focusing theory is a too simple way to explain the causality 
bias of some verbs. The bias observed for the choice of a referent in continuation tasks appears to 
reflect the difficulty in finding a consistent reason or motive explaining why one of the referents 
could be a cause of the previous event. This difficulty is independent of the level of activation of 
both referents before the pronoun is perceived and could be related to the number of constraints 
that an incongruent ending must satisfy to be consistent.
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Figure 1: Tablet surface (The active zone in gray is the part of the tablet surface which can detect 
the position of the stylus). The "departure square" is in black color. The second square (in white 
color) was the zone of the tablet where the subject posed the pen after reading the fragment. 
(Black triangles represent four supports maintaining the position of the sheet). 
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Table 1. Mean reading times (ms) of the fragment to continue in Experiment 1a. Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses. 
      Pronoun 
 
    Congruent   Incongruent 
Verbal bias           overall mean 
  
    N1    6,261    6,385    6,323 
    (1,947)   (2,071) 
 
 
    N2    5,602    5,682    5,642 
    (1,798)   (1,742) 
           
 
overall mean   5,931    6,033 
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Table 2.  Mean planning times (ms) in Experiments 1a and 1b. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
 
      Pronoun 
 
Experiment 1a (self-paced presentation of the fragment to continue) 
    Congruent   Incongruent 
Verbal bias           overall mean 
  
    N1    6,248    8,565    7,406 
    (3,285)   (4,351) 
 
 
    N2    5,462    6,442    5,952 
    (3,244)   (2,934) 
           
 
overall mean   5,855    7,503 
              
 
Experiment 1b (RSVP of the fragment to continue) 
    Congruent   Incongruent 
Verbal bias           overall mean 
  
    N1    4,468    5,763    5,115 
    (2,134)   (2,458) 
 
 
    N2    3,979    4,852    4,415 
    (2,054)   (2,322) 
           
 
overall mean   4,223    5,307 
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Table 3. Mean naming latencies and mean planning times (ms) in Experiment 2. Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses.  
 
 
   Congruent   Incongruent   External 
          
  
   Naming latency 560    558    603 
   (77)    (80)    (89) 
 
 
   Planning time 10,174    13,668    15,158 
   (6,713)   (8,230)   (8,529) 
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Table 4. Mean percentages of explicit references to the alternative character in the congruent and 
incongruent continuations written by the subjects in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2. Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses. The exact proportions are indicated between squared brackets. 
 
 
   Congruent     Incongruent 
   (references to the Reactor)   (references to the Initiator) 
  
   Experiment 1a 33.1% [212/640]    50.0% [320/640] 
   (14.4)      (15.9) 
 
 
   Experiment 1b 36.2% [232/640]    54.7% [350/640] 
   (13.4)      (15.1) 
 
 
   Experiment 2 27.6% [53/192]    35.9% [69/192] 
   (17.3)      (17.8) 
 
